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NOTES AND COMMENTS
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM: CONFLICTS OF
INTERESTS IN NONLITIGIOUS SITUATIONS
As a result of expansion in the size of law firms and consequent growth
in the number of clients represented,1 conflicts of interests problems have
become the hallmark of modem law practice.2 To aid in identifying con-
flicting client interests, the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility (the Code)' states that an attorney owes a fiduciary duty
to each client to keep confidences and to provide competent and loyal legal
representation.' Conflicts of interests may arise from dereliction of these
I Many law firms are growing beyond two hundred attorneys in size. See Cantor, Law
Firms Are Getting Bigger. . . and More Complex, 64 A.B.A.J. 215, 218 (1978). The growth
of law firms is in response to the heavier workload imposed by their clients. See Cantor, Will
There Be a General Motors in Law Practice?, 59 A.B.A.J. 659, 660 (1973); Liebman, The
Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REv.
996, 996 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Liebman].
I The increased demand for legal representation heightens the possibilities for conflicts
of interests to arise. See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir.
1976) (concurrent representation of adverse interests in related antitrust suits); Lewis v.
Shaffer Stores, Co., 218 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (simultaneous representation of
plaintiff corporation and defendant directors in stockholder derivative suit); Note, Legal
Representation of Conflicting Interests: A View Towards Better Self-Regulation, 18 SANTA
CLARA L. Rxv. 997, 997 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Legal Representation]. See also, Com-
ment, Conflicting Interests of Attorneys Representing Both Insurer and Insured, 23 MD. L.
REv. 252 (1963); Comment, Professional Responsibility-Conflicts of Interests Between Legal
Aid Lawyers, 37 Mo. L. REv. 346 (1972). Despite contemporary proliferation of conflict of
interests problems, ethical questions involving conflicts of interests are far from new. See,
e.g., In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 952 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (attorney disqualified for opposing
former client in same controversy); Henry v. Raimon, 25 Pa. 354, 358-59 (1855) (discussion
of fiduciary obligation owed former client in subsequent suit).
3 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIIrY (1977) (ABA Code). The Code consists of
nine Canons expressing the standards of professional behavior required of attorneys. Ethical
Considerations (EC) and Disciplinary Rules (DR) are derived from each Canon. The Ethical
Considerations represent the ethical goals toward which all attorneys should strive, while the
Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in nature and indicate a minimum level of ethical conduct
which an attorney must maintain to avoid disciplinary sanctions. ABA CODE, Preliminary
Statement (1977). See generally Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Morgan].
Federal courts acknowledge the Code as their definitive ethical standard, and conse-
quently, conduct of attorneys appearing before federal'courts is governed by the Code rather
than the professional code of the state in which the federal court sits. See International
Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978); Kramer v. Scientific
Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 n.6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Cord
v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964).
I See ABA CODE, Canons 4 and 5. Canon 4 admonishes an attorney to guard the confiden-
tial information and secrets of a client. ABA CODE, Canon 4; see Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell
Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978). An attorney may,
however, reveal confidential information upon the consent of the client after full disclosure
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fiduciary duties by improperly representing an interest adverse to the in-
terests of a present or former client.5 Representation of adverse interests
creates the possibility of failure to uphold fiduciary responsibilities, be-
cause confidential information received from one client may be used to his
disadvantage in an ongoing or subsequent controversy.'
Since fiduciary obligations commence at the inception of the attorney-
client relationship,7 a conflict of interests in representation may occur
to the client of the reasons for breaching the confidentiality duty. ABA CODE, Disciplinary
Rule (DR) 4-101(C)(1); see text accompanying notes 91-95 infra. Canon 5 requires a lawyer
to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client. ABA C6DE, Canon 5.
Under Canon 5, an attorney has a duty to maintain undivided loyalty to his clients, to
represent them fully and fairly with unimpeded and unimpaired independence of judgment,
and to advise each client of his best course of action. Id. See In re Westgate-California Corp.
[1979] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 67,083 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1978); Note, Attorney's Conflict
of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to That of Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REv. 61,
64 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Attorney's Conflict]. See generally Elson, Responsibilities to
the Client, in PROrkSSIONAL RESPONSsITY: A GUIDE FOR ATroRNEs 67 (1978).
5 See ABA CODE, Ethical Consideration (EC) 7-1. Proper representation of a client re-
quires that an attorney act to promote his client's interests within the bounds of established
law. See id.; Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REv. 575, 584 (1961).
The Code defines improper representation as that which is likely to have an adverse effect
on an attorney's judgment or will involve the attorney in representing differing interests
without consent from the parties affected. ABA CoDE, DR 5-105, DEF NrONS (1); see Doe v.
A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352, 1354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hall v. A.
Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972). The attorney in Doe was a tax specialist in a firm that
represented the defendant corporations and had knowledge of the corporations' confidential
files. Id. at 1354. Upon leaving the firm, the attorney bought one share of A Corporation
common stock, admitting that his purchase was for the express purpose of either ousting the
current management of A Corporation or initiating a shareholder's derivative suit. Id. The
Doe court disqualified the attorney and held that the attorney's participation in the suit
would require him either to take actions which might injuriously affect his former clients in
matters involving their prior representation or to use confidential information to the disad-
vantage of his former clients. Id. at 1355; see H. DRnI1ER, LEGAL ETmcs 105 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as DRINKER]; Aronson, Conflict of Interests, 52 WASH. L. Rxv. 807, 834
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Aronson].
I See Aronson, supra note 5, at 812. Once an attorney obtains confidential client informa-
tion, his knowledge likely provides him with an advantageous understanding of a subsequent
controversy that is related, but adverse to a prior representation. See, e.g., Chugach Elec.
Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
820 (1967); Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In
the course of representing interests adverse to a former client, an attorney may, despite
conscientious attempts to resist, subconsciously use his former client's confidences against
him. See Liebman, supra note 1, at 998.
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). In Westinghouse, several utility companies sued the defen-
dants for breach of contract in response to its failure to supply uranium. Id. at 1313. As a
result, Westinghouse initiated an antitrust suit alleging restraint of trade on the part of
several corporations engaged in various aspects of the uranium business. Id. The American
Petroleum Institute (API) retained the law firm of Kirkland, Ellis & Rowe (Kirkland), also
representing Westinghouse, to prepare a study determining the extent of competition within
the energy industry. Id. at 1313-14. The report indicated healthy competition among the
energy industries and was released on the same day that Kirkland filed the antitrust suit
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outside the context of litigation in negotiations, investigations, and pro-
ceedings that do not involve an adversarial confrontation in court.8 The
Code and present case law, however, do not adequately distinguish be-
tween litigious and nonlitigious representation and, therefore, fail to ad-
dress the problems peculiar to conflicts of interests arising in nonlitigious
circumstances.'
against several of the defendant corporations, including several members of API. Id. at 1314.
In determining whether an attorney-client relationship existed between Kirkland and API,
the Seventh Circuit decided that there are no formal requirements such as payment of fees
or execution of a contract to the creation of an attorney-client relationship, nor need an
attorney-client relationship arise by agency. Id. at 1317-18. The court concluded that a
fiduciary relationship is created when a client confers with an attorney in his professional
capacity as legal advisor and divulges confidential information to the attorney. Id. at 1320;
see Attorney's Conflict, supra note 4, at 66. Upon finding that an attorney-client relationship
did exist between API and Kirkland, the court applied the presumption that client confid-
ences are disclosed within a law firm, see text accompanying notes 26-45 infra, despite
Kirkland's assertion that no confidential information passed between the Washington, D.C.
office that prepared the API report and the Chicago office that represented Westinghouse.
580 F.2d at 1321. The court disqualified Kirkland for violating its fiduciary duties of confiden-
tiality, loyalty, and avoidance of the appearance of impropriety incorporated in Canons 4, 5,
and 9 of the Code. Id. Although actual representation has ceased, an attorney's fiduciary
duties to his former client continue. See ABA CODE, EC 4-6; Note, Disqualification of Counsel
for the Appearance of Professional Impropriety, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 343, 353 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Disqualification of Counsel]. Even the death of a former client does not
release an attorney from the fiduciary obligations owed to a client when the client was alive.
See DRINKER, supra note 5, at 113.
8 See, e.g., In re Westgate-California Corp. [1979] BAmm. L. REP. (CCH) 67,083 (S.D.
Cal. Dec. 28, 1978). In Westgate, the law firm represented multiple clients with potentially
conflicting interests during a hearing before the Securities Exchange Cmmission and an
investigation by the FBI and Comptroller of the Currency. Id. The court held that, despite
the nonlitigious natures of the investigative proceedings, an attorney owes his clients undi-
vided loyalty and confidentiality. Id.; Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567
F.2d 225, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1977) (fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality exist during
investigation prior to litigation).
9 See, e.g., ABA CODE, EC 5-15; see text accompanying notes 65-78 ihfra. A major
criticism of the Code is its inflexible approach to ethical problems encountered by attorneys.
See G. HAZARD, LEGAL ETmics IN THE PRACrICE OF LAw 6-11, 33-42 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as HAZARD]. The Disciplinary Rules state a mandatory minimum level of professional con-
duct. ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement. Violation of a Disciplinary Rule constitutes unethi-
cal conduct as a matter of law, although an attorney's actions may be justified by a less
mechanical approach to legal ethics. HAZARD, supra, at 6; see text accompanying notes 68-75
infra.
The Code also fails to address several specific problems arising in nonlitigious situations.
HAZARD, supra at 7-10. First, the Code assumes that the client is easily identifiable. Id. at 7.
In a nonlitigious situation, however, corporate interests or multiple clients' interests may be
under negotiation, thus making it difficult to ascertain the proper individual or client group
with whom to consult concerning major decisions. Moreover, conflicts of interests arise only
between persons or entities that have client status with an attorney or a law firm. See In re
Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976) (movant lacked
standing to disqualify opposing counsel where standing based upon public policy reasons
instead of an attorney-client relationship); note 6 supra; cf. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp.
v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977) (no attorney-client relationship between
defendant and his co-defendant's former attorney). Secondly, the Code recognizes only four
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Courts traditionally have used the "substantial relationship" test to
determine whether to disqualify counsel incident to a potential or actual
conflict of interests.'" The substantial relationship test probes the relation-
ship between the subject matters of the prior and subsequent representa-
tions to determine whether the interests of the former and current clients
are adverse." Although the substantial relationship test helps courts de-
cide whether conflicts of interests are present in lawsuits,'2 the test pro-
vides inadequate ethical guidelines in a non-trial setting. The indefinite,
and inflexible nature of the test makes the standards difficult for an attor-
ney to apply where conflict of interests issues have not been defined by
preparation for an adversarial contest.'" Furthermore, the substantial rela-
tionship test does not address the issue of whether an attorney, who has
made a good faith determination that no impropriety exists under the
circumstances of the past and present client relationships, may continue
to represent the current client in a nonlitigious situation without obtaining
the consent of the former client." Finally, a former client's refusal to give
consent raises the question of whether that client has any recourse against
his former attorney even though the conflict of interests arose within a
nonlitigious controversy."
of the many roles an attorney may assume: advocate, advisor, impartial arbitrator, and
mediator. See, e.g., ABA CODE, EC 7-4, EC 7-5, EC 5-20; see HAZARD, supra, at 9; cf. text
accompanying notes 78-87 infra. Finally, the Code fails to specify the extent of disclosure to
or the adequacy of consent from a client required under DR 5-105 in order to represent
properly any interests adverse to that client. See ABA CODE, DR 5-105(C). The disclosure-
with-consent provision in DR 5-105(C) states that an attorney must make a full disclosure to
his clients that have conflicting interests of the circumstances surrounding the conflict and
must obtain their consent. Id. More definite standards for the disclosure-with-consent provi-
sion would ensure that an attorney could ethically alleviate a conflict of interests, thereby
protecting client interests and resolving legal problems without the time and expense of
resorting to court action. See generally Morgan, supra note 3.
,0 See Novo Terapeutisk Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir.
1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1978); City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 208 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 573
F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); In re Yam Processing Patent
Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975).
" See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). The T. C. Theatre court was the first to advance the substantial relationship test. See
Liebman, supra note 1, at 1001. In T. C. Theatre, an attorney represented a motion picture
distributor in an antitrust suit and subsequently represented a motion picture operator in a
similar suit against his former client. 113 F. Supp. at 267-68. Examining the alleged conflict
of interests, the court held that a former client need only show that the matters within the
pending suit are substantially related to matters in which the opposing attorney previously
represented the former client in order to disqualify the attorney. Id. at 268.
1 Although disqualification cases arise in the context of litigation, the Code requires
attorneys participating in nonlitigious representation to recognize conflicts of interests and
to withdraw from the unethical representation. See ABA CODE, DR 5-105; note 9 supra.
,3 See text accompanying notes 68-87 infra.
11 See text accompanying notes 88-107 infra.
15 See, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Miller, 22 Ohio St. 2d 7, 257 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1970); In
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Resolution of conflicts of interests problems begins with an examina-
tion of the alleged conflict in light of the substantial relationship test. The
purpose of the substantial relationship test is to protect clients from the
possible adverse use of any confidential information obtained in the course
of a previous attorney-client relationship."6 Upon moving to disqualify op-
posing counsel,'7 the moving party must establish three elements of proof.
The movant must prove the existence of a prior attorney-client relation-
ship, a substantial relationship between current and prior representations,
and an adversity of interests between current and former clients." The
former client need not prove actual use of confidential information by his
former attorney or any resultant harm because the showing might result
in disclosure of the information the client seeks to keep confidential."
Consequently, disqualification of counsel due to a conflict of interests is
based upon a series of presumptions underlying the three components of
the substantial relationship test.
Proof of a former attorney-client relationship gives rise to the presump-
tion that the attorney has access to his client's confidences."0 This pre-
sumed knowledge of confidential information is based upon the fiduciary
re Hall, 73 Wash. 2d 401, 438 P.2d 874, 874-75 (1968); see text accompanying notes 108-112
infra.
" See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1973). Although
an individual has a right to chobse the attorney he wishes to represent him, see, e.g., Hull v.
Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir. 1975); United States Indus., Inc. v. Goldman, 421
F. Supp. 7, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), courts attempt to balance~an individual's right to a freely
chosen attorney with the need to maintain the highest ethical standards of professional
responsibility. 478 F.2d at 565. If a client believed that his attorney would divulge or use
confidential information to the client's detriment, the client's hesitance to speak freely would
result in a chilling effect on the attorney's maximum access to relevant facts, seriously
jeopardizing effective representation. Id. at 570-71.
11 A district court has jurisdiction to hear a party's motion to disqualify opposing counsel
based upon the court's power to regulate the conduct of the bar. See Hull v. Celanese Corp.,
513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975); note 109 infra. Furthermore, a court may disqualify an
attorney on the court's own motion. See Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143
F. Supp. 627, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
11 See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d
Cir. 1975); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 207 (N.D. Ohio
1977); Attorney's Conflicts, supra note 4, at 66. See generally:Legal Representation, supra
note 2.
11 See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). One court
has suggested in camera examinations of alleged confidential information to ascertain
whether a substantial relationship exists between the confidences previously given and the
issues presently in controversy. See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit
Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954). An in camera hearing, however, forces
the client to disclose confidential information that should remain privileged even from the
judge, because the case may be prejudiced if the same judge is also the trier of fact. See T.C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Note,
Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALz
L.J. 917, 926 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification of Attorneys].
See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209 (N.D.
Ohio 1977).
1980]
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nature of the role of the lawyer as legal advisor." The circuit courts disa-
gree, however, on whether the disclosure presumption is rebuttable.? An
irrebuttable presumption avoids an inquiry into the content of the infor-
mation, thereby protecting client confidences regardless of the nature of
the legal representation.? A rebuttable presumption, however, permits the
court to make a factual reconstruction of the alleged attorney-client rela-
tionship to determine whether it is reasonable to assume that confidential
information has passed between attorney and client.24 A rebuttable pre-
sumption of disclosure of client confidences is preferable because courts
analyze conflict of interests problems on a case-by-case basis.? Analyzing
the nature and scope of the representation permits an informed resolution
of conflicts allegations in cases where transfer of confidential information
is doubtful.2 6 Furthermore, courts may obtain guidance from prior cases
2 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1320 (7th Cir.
1978). The protection that Canon 4 extends to communications between an attorney and a
potential client depends upon the client's belief that he is consulting the attorney in the
attorney's professional capacity. See McCoMscK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENc E, § 92
at 183 (2d ed., 1972); ABA CODE, EC 4-1. The fiduciary obligations of an attorney to a client
do not arise, therefore, where a person consults an attorney as a friend, see Modern Woodmen
v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1942), or seeks the attorney's services as a scrivener
who merely drafts a document, see Benson v. Custer, 236 Iowa 345, 347 17 N.W.2d 889, 892
(1945); Attorney's Conflict, supra note 4, at 66.
2 The Seventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits have endorsed an irrebuttable presumption
that an attorney has access to a client's confidential information. See Novo Terapeutisk Lab.
v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225-26 (7th Cir. 1978) (irrebuttable presumption upheld to
avoid improper examination of conversations between attorney and client); Fred Weber, Inc.
v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977) (rebuttable presumption destroys client's
privilege against disclosure of confidential information); In re Yarn Processing Patent Valid-
ity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976) (irrebuttable presumption promotes frank
attorney-client exchange and public confidence in legal profession). The Second Circuit is
divided between a strict interpretation of the presumption, see Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex,
Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973), and a liberal interpretation, see Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975). The court in Emle
reasoned that a rebuttable presumption would destroy the strong policy underlying Canon 4
that communications between attorney and client are privileged. 478 F.2d at 571; see ABA
CODE, Canon 4. In contrast, the Silver Chrysler court adopted a rebuttable presumption of
receipt of client confidences to promote a case-by-case analysis of conflict of interests prob-
lems. 518 F.2d at 754. See also City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co., 440 F. Supp.
193, 209 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (fairness and pragmatics of specialization in legal practice necessi-
tate flexible approach to conflicts of interests).
2 See Novo Terapeutisk Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 191-92 (7th
Cir. 1979).
24 See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209 (N.D. Ohio
1977),
2 See, e.g., International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279 (3d Cir.
1978); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir.
1975); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 195 (N.D. Ohio
1977); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Attorney's
Conflict, supra note 4, at 65.
26 See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209 (N.D.
Ohio 1977); see note 21 supra.
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with similar fact patterns if they admit evidence of the nature of the legal
representation to rebut the disclosure presumption.Y
Upon proof that a client has disclosed confidential information to his
attorney, courts will apply a presumption imputing the disclosure to all
members of the attorney's law firm.2 Absent an opportunity to rebut, the
imputation effectively treats the entire law firm as the client's attorney,
thereby enhancing the possibility that conflicts of interests will arise.
9 The
circuit courts are divided over whether the imputation presumption is
rebuttable or irrebuttable.5 Courts adopting an irrebuttable presumption
See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1979); Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754-55 (2d Cir. 1975); see notes 30 and 53
infra.
" See Novo Terapeutisk Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir.
1979); Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Laskey Bros. V.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
In Novo, a single attorney in the Hume firm received confidential information from the
Baxter laboratory regarding a patent application for an enzyme. 607 F.2d at 194-95. The firm,
however, did not represent Baxter when Baxter was a defendant in a subsequent patent
interference proceeding. Id. Upon leaving the firm, the attorney who had received the confi-
dential information represented Baxter in an enzyme patent infringement controversy
brought by Novo. Id. Although he moved to disqualify his former firm, the attorney did not
allege that Baxter's confidences were shared with other members of the Hume firm. Id. at
197. Under these circumstances, the court maintained that a rebuttable imputation pre-
sumption was appropriate and held that affidavits from the remaining firm members denying
receipt of confidential information were sufficient to rebut the presumption of imputed
knowledge. Id.; see Attorney's Conflicts, supra note 4, at 70.
See Attorney's Conflicts, supra note 4, at 70. If knowledge of confidential information
is imputed to all members of a firm, the disqualification of one attorney for representing
interests adverse to a former client extends to the entire law firm. See Consolidated Theatres,
Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 922 & 928 (2d Cir. 1954); Fisher
Studio, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 232 F.2d 199, 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956). If
an attorney represents a client and later becomes associated with another firm that represents
an adversary of the former client, the attorney has presumably "tainted" his new firm with
confidential information, thus vicariously disqualifying the firm from representing its client.
See ABA CODE, DR 5-105(D); Lasky Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827
(2d Cir. 1955). Vicarious disqualification frequently results when-a former government attor-
ney re-enters the private sector as a member of a law firm. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606
F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1979); note 38 infra. But see Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791
(Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam); note 39 infra.
See generally Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, 70 HAlv. L. Rav. 657 (1957); Lacovara, Restricting The Private Law Practice
of Former Government Lawyers, 20 Aiz. L. Rav. 369 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lacovara];
82 DIcK. L. Ray. 625 (1977).
The Eighth and Fifth Circuits favor the theory of fully imputed knowledge of confiden-
tial information throughout an entire law firm, reasoning that an irrebuttable imputation
presumption preserves client confidences, encourages attorney-client communicati6n, and
bolsters public confidence in the integrity of the bench and bar. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell
Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,
571 (5th Cir. 1973); note 22 supra. In Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chryslers Motor
Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit required only a rebuttable presumption
of imputed knowledge in an effort to reject a mechanistic approach to conflicts of interests.
Id. at 754. However, a recent Second Circuit case involving a former government attorney
1980]
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acknowledge that the imputation presumption recognizes that attorneys in
the same firm discuss client confidences.3 A law firm, however, may be-
come so large as to render intrafirm knowledge of all client confidences
impossible.2 The irrebuttable imputation presumption also recognizes the
edict in Canon 9 of the Code that attorneys should avoid even the appear-
ance of impropriety in order to promote public confidence in the legal
profession." An expansive reading of Canon 9 in conjunction with the
presumed intrafirm'knowledge of all confidential information, therefore,
necessitates a strict prophylactic rule prohibiting representation by any
member of the firm of a client whose interests are adverse to those of any
former client. 4 Although a strict preventive measure may be warranted in
some cases,3" disqualification is only justifiable under a case-by-case ap-
proach with the court examining circumstances surrounding the represen-
tation, including any practical measures taken by the law firm to restrict
confidences to one or a few attorneys in the firm."
One effort to prevent the dissemination of confidential information
throughout a law firm and, thereby, avoid the appearance of impropriety
is the "Chinese Wall" or isolation system.37 Under the Chinese Wall theory,
imposed an irrebuttable imputation presumption to prevent a government attorney from
giving preference to a case in order to enhance his prospect of future employment with that
firm. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1979). In Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Kee-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit refused to permit
any practical efforts, such as locked files, on the part of a law firm to modify the imputation
presumption. Id. at 1321. However, in Novo Terapeutisk Lab. v. Bakter Travenol Lab., Inc.,
607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979), the court allowed a rebuttable imputation presumption because
the only attorney who had received confidential information during prior representation of
Baxter was representing Baxter in a later controversy. Id. at 197; see note 28 supra. The Sixth
Circuit rejected the harshness of an irrebuttable presumption and adopted a rebuttable
imputation presumption in order to allow for the lack of communication of client confidences
between departments in a large law firm. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co.,
573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.) (meri. opinion) aff'g 440 F. Supp. 193, 210 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
3 See note 28 supra.
32 See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 211 (N.D. Ohio
1977); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In Standard
Oil, the court applied the doctrine of vertical responsibility which states that an office head
is presumed to possess the knowledge of his juniors, but not necessarily that of his peers. Id.
at 362. Although usually applied to government attorneys, the doctrine is also applicable to
large, departmentalized law firms. See 440 F. Supp. at 211.
3 ABA CODE, Canon 9. See id. at EC 9-1; Novo Terapeutisk Lab. v. Baxter Travenol
Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979).
11 See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). But see
International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975) (question of
"appearances" under Canon 9 should not be used as convenient tool for disqualification).
3 See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976) (concurrent
representation of adverse interests in antitrust suit deemed prima facie improper).
11 See text accompanying note 25 supra. See generally Note, Unchanging Rules in Chang-
ing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YA L.J. 1058
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Unchanging Rules].
11 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.
1978); Unchanging Rules, supra note 36, at 1075-77. See also Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese
Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 459 (1975).
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a law firm may segregate its specialized areas of practice to preclude com-
munication of confidential information among departments." A firm may,
in addition, erect a Chinese Wall around an attorney who once represented
interests substantially related and adverse to interests of a current client."
By consistently screening clients, cases and attorneys and limiting access
to case files and records, the firm theoretically halts transmission of privi-
leged information and thereby prevents confidences from becoming com-
mon knowledge throughtout the law firm." In situations involving concur-
1 See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. lum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 197 (N.D. Ohio
1977). In the Cleveland case, the court determined that each department of the large law firm
involved was a separate and distinct section of the firm pursuing its own speciality. Id. at
211. The court held that absent direct proof to the contrary, an attorney was not deemed to
be privy to confidential information relating to the matters exclusively in the sphere of
another department. Id. This vertical responsibility rule, see United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); note 32 supra, in conjunction with judicial notice
of law firm compartmentalization, constitutes an implicit recognition of the Chinese Wall
system as a preventative measure against the dissemination of confidential information. 136
F. Supp. at 362. But see Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84, 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Chinese Wall system deemed inadequate ethical safeguard where law firm
represented two adverse clients in same suit).
' See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793-94 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam). The
Kesselhaut court held that strict adherence to specific screening measures designed to insu-
late a disqualified attorney from his associates can rebut the inflexible rule of disqualification
of former government attorneys working in the private sector. Id. The screening measures in
Kesselhaut included separate locked files, avoidance of casual conversation concerning client
representation, and denial of compensation from earnings made from the representation
adverse to the interests of another client. Id. at 793. See ABA Com. ON PaOFUSSIONAL ETMCS,
OPInIONs, No. 342, at 11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Formal Opinion 342]; Lacovara, supra
note 29, at 390-93; 82 DicK. L. Rav. 625, 633 (1977). But see W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook
Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 824-25 (D. Conn. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962)
(isolation of fees from disqualified attorney insufficient to allow further representation).
10 But see Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1979). In order to avoid a
conflict of interests arising from the recent association of a former government attorney with
the firm of Gordon, Hurwitz, Butowsky, Baker, Weitzen & Shalov followed the procedures
set forth in Formal Opinion 342, supra note 39 at 12, for resolving conflicts of interests
between a former government attorney and his former adversary. 606 F.2d at 29; see note 39
supra. After the law firm and the plaintiff concluded that the firm could ethically represent
the plaintiff, the Gordon firm set up screening measures to prevent the new associate from
participating in the representation of a client who had been the associate's former adversary.
606 F.2d at 29. Continuing to follow the dictates of Formal Opinion 342, the firm obtained
authorization for the representation by the firm from the associate's former government office
and from the district court. Id.; see Formal Opinion 342, supra note 39 at 12. Since the
associate acknowledged his disqualification, the issue in Armstrong was whether the disquali-
fication extended to the law firm. 606 F.2d at 30. The court did not reject screening devices
in all circumstances, id. at 32, but criticized screening measures as ineffective to prevent
circumvention of the screening devices, or the appearance of impropriety. Id. at 34; see note
45 infra. The court based its decision to disqualify the entire firm on the possibility that the
former government attorney had used his government position as a means for obtaining later
professional employment in the private sector. 606 F.2d at 33; see note 30 supra. The court
held that disqualification of the entire firm was a prophylactic measure necessary to guard
against misuse of authority and of confidential information by government attorneys. 606
F.2d at 39.
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rent representation of adverse interests, however, an isolation system may
not be sufficient to purge an appearance of impropriety." Although repre-
sentation of interests adverse to a former client may also appear to be
improper, representation of adversaries in the same suit creates an over-
whelming possibility for unpermitted use of confidential information and
for disloyalty to clients and results in an appearance of gross impropriety."
The size of the law firm is another important factor in determining
whether confidences can reasonably be imputed to the entire firm and
whether an appearance of impropriety actually exists. 3 Although members
of a small firm may have knowledge of all client confidences, intrafirm
knowledge of all client confidences is unlikely in a large firm of over fifty
attorneys." Examination of intrafirm operations, however, may show that
alleged screening procedures are superficial measures which only lend an
appearance of propriety to unethical representation.45 A rebuttable pre-
sumption of imputed knowledge would consider the size and internal or-
ganization of a law firm and recognize the possibility that the Chinese Wall
defense may not comport with the actual facts of law firm operations.
Although an irrebuttable imputation presumption avoids evidentiary
problems raised by the Chinese Wall defense, an irrebuttable presumption
of that knowledge is imputed to all members if a law firm fails to take into
account the nature of the representation involved and any measures taken
to prevent dissemination of confidential information." A rebuttable impu-
" See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84,96 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); see note 8 supra.
41 See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); note 31 supra;
cf. International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (disqualifica-
tion for simultaneous representation of unrelated matters justified as vindication of integrity
of bar). See generally In re Westgate-California Corp. [1979] BANKm. L. REP. (CCH) 67,083
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1978).
I See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d
Cir. 1975); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975); City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. llum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 211 (N.D. Ohio 1977); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But see Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir. 1978).
" See Liebman, supra note 1, at 1018; see text accompanying notes 27-32 supra. See
generally Unchanging Rules, supra note 36.
Is See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1979); note 40 supra. The
Armstrong court criticized a screening measure which withheld from a former government
attorney any fees received in the course of subsequent representation of interests adverse to
the United States government. 606 F.2d at 34. The court based its criticism on the lack of
effective means to prevent an upward adjustment of the disqualified attorney's earnings. Id.
Despite the absence of overt compensation, a law firm could award associate bonuses or
increased partnership shares to the disqualified attorney. Id. Furthermore, the Armstrong
court determined that insulating fees does not diminish the appearance of impropriety be-
cause the fee arrangement would be unknown to casual observers and unpersuasive to the
more informed. Id.
1' See Formal Opinion 342, supra note 39, at 11-12; 31 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR
OF THE Crry OF NEW YORK 552, 563 (1976); text accompanying notes 37-45 supra. See generally
82 DICK. L. REv. 625 (1977).
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tation presumption, however, would allow courts to uphold high ethical
standards in the legal profession while preserving the freedom of clients to
retain the counsel of their choice.47 Furthermore, by permitting evidence
to rebut presumed intrafirm disclosures, courts may thwart motions for
disqualification made merely for strategic purposes." Although the impu-
tation presumption attempts to recognize the realities of modem law prac-
tice," allowing an opportunity to rebut the presumption mitigates the
harsh effect of an expansive reading of Canon 9. A rebuttable presumption
also may lead to the recognition that law firms can adopt measures to
prevent the disclosure of confidential information exchanged between an
'attorney and his client.
Once an attorney-client relationship has been established, the substan-
tial relationship test requires a determination of-the similarity between the
subject matter of the prior representation and the issues involved in repre-
senting the new client. Since the test was first promulgated," courts have
equivocated on the degree of similarity necessary to constitute a substan-
tial relationship." Courts do agree, however, that there must be more than
a superficial similarity between the- natures of the two representations.2
Until recently, the most definitive assessment of the substantial relation-
ship test required a "patently clear" relationship between the prior and
current representations. 3 The patently clear requirement ' is an attempt by
,7 See Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Lasky Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827
(2d Cir. 1955); Unchanging Rules, supra note 36, at 928.
See Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed
sub nor. Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959)
(motion to disqualify made in bad faith or for harrassment will not survive judicial scrutiny).
A successful motion to disqualify may effectively'preclude a lawsuit due to the inability, of a
large corporate client to find a law firm with sufficient size and resources that has not
represented a client in the same industry. See Liebman, supra note 1, at 1035.
" See text accompanying note 31 supra. But see text accompanying note 32 supra.
50 See T.C. Theatres Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); note 11 supra.
" See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 759 (2d
Cir. 1975); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See
also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1307 (N.D. Ell.), rev'd
sub nor. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
52 See Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 553 n.51 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (connection
between former representation and issues currently in litigation insufficient to constitute
substantial relationship).
53 See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d
Cir. 1975). In Chrysler, the defendant moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel, Hammond and
Schreiber, because Schreiber had once been an associate in the offices of Kelley, Drye,
Chrysler Motors Corp.'s counsel, and had worked on matters involving Chrysler Motors. Id.
at 752. In determining whether a substantial relationship existed between Schreiber's prior
work and the nature of the present controversy, the Second Circuit examined several disquali-
fication cases where the substantial relationship was found "patently clear." Id. at 754-55;
see Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975); General Motors Corp. v. City of
New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir. 1974); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,
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the Second Circuit to restrict an overly broad application of Canon 9's
prohibition of even the appearance of impropriety." The Seventh Circuit
has recently acknowledged that Canon 9 must be a limited factor in the
test for conflicts of interests, but has modified the thrust of the patently
clear portion of the test to incorporate more flexibility into the conflict of
interests determination by adopting a rebuttable presumption of similarity
between representations. 5 The Seventh Circuit examined the connection
between the issues present in the representations of the former and current
clients. 6 The court, however, required that the relevance of the allegedly
confidential information to the issues raised in the pending litigation be
gauged by the Code violations alleged in the complaint and by assessment
571-72 (2d Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972);
Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Adopting a
rebuttable imputation presumption, 518 F.2d at 754, the court held that disqualification of
Schreiber was not warranted because he had little or no involvement with client confidences
or case strategy in the course of his earlier research on questions of law concerning Chrysler
Motors. Id. at 757; see text accompanying note 86 infra. But see Liebman, supra note 1, at
1011-37.
"' Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir.
1975). The court in Silver Chrysler determined that Canon 9 is not intended to control over
Canon 4's confidentiality requirement in a disqualification case and making a realistic ap-
praisal of the circumstances surrounding the prior and current representations. Id. The court
directed, however, that to avoid the appearance of impropriety, conflicts of interests should
be resolved in favor of disqualification. Id.; see Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d
Cir. 1975).
11 See Novo Terapeutisk Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 189-90 (7th
Cir. 1979).
The Novo court adopted a version of the substantial relationship test announced in
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 211, 225 (7th Cir. 1978), 607 F.2d at
190. The Westinghouse court decided that disqualification questions require three determina-
tions. 588 F.2d at 255. Initially, the trial judge must reconstruct the scdpe of the.prior legal
representation from the facts of the case to determine whether a connection exists between
the prior and current representations. Id. Secondly, a court must determine whether it is
reasonable to infer that the confidential information allegedly given would have been given
to a lawyer representing a client in those matters. Id. Finally, the court must decide from
the issues stated in the briefs whether the information acquired is relevant to the issues raised
in the litigation pending against the former client. Id.
In Westinghouse the defendant moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the grounds
that the Bigbee firm had represented the defendant on legal matters relating to uranium
operations which were allegedly substantially related to the present antitrust suit against
price fixing by uranium producers. Id. at 222-23. Applying the first prong of the test, the
Westinghouse court determined that both the prior and current representations concerned the
defendants' mining patents and uranium properties. Id. at 225. Under the second inquiry of
the test, the court found that information regarding quantity and quality of uranium, and
any production agreements would have been given to the Bigbee firm by the defendant. Id.
Applying the final prong of the disqualificition test, the court determined that an agreement
to restrict production of uranium is a price-fixing agreement and, therefore, relevant to the
present antitrust suit. Id. at 226. Finding the incentives to disclose and abuse confidential
information to be present, the court held that disqualification of the Bigbee firm was proper.
Id. at 227.
" See, e.g., Novo Terapeutisk Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 191-93
(7th Cir. 1979); see note 55 supra.
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of the evidence offered to establish the violations.57 Relevance, therefore,
is measured against potential, instead of expected, avenues of proof of
Code violations.58 Although this inquiry adds c6ncreteness to the substan-
tial relationship standard, the Seventh Circuit's test also retains flexibility
by examining the circumstances surrounding the representations and the
relevance of the alleged confidences to possible means of proof in the origi-
nal lawsuit.
The third inquiry of the substantial relationship test concerns the ad-
versity between the interests of the party moving for disqualification and
his opponent." The adversity requirement is grounded in Canon 5 which
prohibits representation of multiple parties without their consent if repre-
sentation of differing interests could have an adverse effect on the judg-
ment or loyalty of the attorney to a client."0 Although a finding of requisite
adversity of interests is vital in determining whether a conflict of interests
exists, courts differ on guidelines for ascertaining adversity."
One adversity test focuses on the information disclosed to an attorney
by his clients." Courts utilizing this test examine the nature of the former
and present representations to determine the likelihood that an attorney
will use the confidences of a former client to that client's detriment in a
subsequent proceeding.63 Although this test for adversity is pragmatic and
adaptable to various factual situations, the test fails to examine the pos-
ture, a function-related attitude, of an attorney towards his former client
in a subsequent controversy that is substantially related to the former
representation. 4
Recent cases have articulated a test under which a representation is
sufficiently adverse when an attorney must assert a position on behalf of
one client which his duty to another client requires him to oppose. 5 This
11 See Novo Terpauetisk Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir.
1979); accord, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1978).
53 Id.
" See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. llum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 207 (N.D. Ohio
1977) (adversity present where clients' interests are antagonistic); Jeffry v. Pounds, 67 Cal.
App. 3d 6, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376 (1977); Attorney's Conflict, supra note 4, at 73.
See ABA CODE, DR 5-105, EC 5-14.
" Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1978)
and Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973) with City of Cleve-
land v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 207-08 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
,1 See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608-09 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); see note 63 infra.
3 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1978); note
55 supra; accord, NCK Org., Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1976).
' See HAZARD, supra note 9, at 58-68. The role assumed by an attorney determines
whether a conflict of interests will develop between clients. Id. at 78. For example, if an
attorney regards a conflict of interests between multiple parties as minor, he may assume the
role of negotiator and attempt to harmonize the diverse interests before they escalate into
full-fledged conflicts. See id. at 64. But see ABA CODE, EC 5-16, EC 5-20.
11 See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978); City
of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 208 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Cinema
5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976); Grievance Comm. of the Bar
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view of adversity analyzes the functions an attorney performs while solving
a client's legal problems and the effect that the attorney's actions and
attitude will have on his l6'yalty towards a former client and on the public's
perception of the propriety of the subsequent representation."6 As an ad-
junct to the information-oriented test for adversity, the posture test clari-
fies the adversity inquiry by examining the possibility that confidential
information will be disclosed by virtue of the role the attorney has under-
taken in the course of a specific, subsequent representation. In determin-
ing adversity between parties, the posture test is a pragmatic tool which
provides substance and adaptability to the adversity inquiry under the
substantial relationship test.
Although the substantial relationship test is the accepted approach to
disqualification cases," modification of the test is necessary if it is to be
an effective indicator of conflicts of interests in litigious and nonlitigious
situations." Since conflicts of interests often arise outside of litigation,
attorneys look to disqualification cases to provide guidelines for avoiding
conflicts of interests in nonlitigious situations.70 Since conflict of interests
cases, therefore, have precedential value in litigious and nonlitigious situa-
tions, the substantial relationship test must be adaptable to various types
of legal representation. Rebuttable presumptions of confidential disclo-
v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 65, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (1964). In Cleveland, the court held that the
law firm's role as bond counsel did not put it in an adverse posture toward the disqualifiction
movant and, therefore, the firm was not improperly representing differing iriterests. 440 F.
Supp. at 208.
11 See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978);
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); see ABA CODE, Canon
5. Although the Code indicates 'that there are few situations where an attorney is justified in
representing multiple clients in litigation who have potentially differing interests, ABA CoDE,
EC 5-15, the Code does recognize that there are instances not involving litigation in which a
lawyer may properly serve multiple clients having differing interests. Id.; see id. at EC 5-20.
But see id. at EC 5-19. See generally HAZARD, supra note 9, at 58; see also Frank, The Legal
Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. Rzv. 683 (1965).
17 See, e.g., Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam). The Gas-A-Tron case concerned a private antitrust action instituted against several
oil companies, including Shell Oil and Exxon. Id. at 1323-24. The defendants moved to
disqualify plaintiff's counsel, the Berman firm, because that firm had hired a new associate,
Burbidge, who had previously worked for a large firm that represented Shell and Exxon in
other cases. Id. at 1324. In its resolution of the disqualification issue, the Gas-A-Tron court
examined the general nature of the work Burbidge performed and the amount of time he spent
on each project involving the present defendants. Id. The court determined that Burbidge
had performed research and drafting tasks commonly assigned to young associates. Id. The
Gas-A-Tron court held that in the roles of researcher and draftsman, Burbidge had not
actually obtained any confidential information that would be relevant to the pending anti-
trust litigation. Id. at 1325. Accordingly, the court in Gas-A-Tron refused to disqualify Bur-
bidge or vicariously disqualify the Berman firm. Id.; see note 64 supra.
U See text accompanying note 10 supra.
See generally Liebman, supra note 1; Attorney's Conflict, supra note 4.
10 See generally Morgan, supra note 3; Attorney's Conflict, supra note 4; Legal Represen-
tation, supra note 2.
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sures7' and imputed knowledge 2 permit a more informed analysis of differ-
ent factors, and may preclude a finding of a conflict of interests by recog-
nizing effective use of an isolation system73 or the absence of an attorney-
client relationship. 74 In addition, the components of the substantial rela-
tionship test must be concrete enough to provide a standard of review in
alleged conflict of interests situations that will prevent undue arbitrariness
in court decisions. Furthermore, more definite standards for judging pro-
fessional behavior will enable attorneys to recognize'and avoid conflicts of
interests more readily, thereby protecting the interests of current and for-
mer clients and upholding the integrity of the bar. After applying the
modified substantial relationship test to the anticipated representation of
a client, an attorney must still decline employment if he has any remaining
doubts concerning the propriety of the representation.
7 5
Although the substantial relationship test is a creation of the court
system, the Code of Professional Responsibility attempts to serve as a
fundamental guide to ethical behavior in situations where a conflict of
interests may arise." Although circumstances involving conflicts of inter-
ests are growing in number and complexity, the present Code does not
provide adequate ethical guidelines suitable to the dynamics of contempo-
rary legal practice.7 1 In recognition of the shortcomings in the current Code,
the American Bar Association Special Committee on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards has proposed a working draft of the Rules of Professional
Conduct (Proposed Rules) .
7
The Proposed Rules adopt a holistic view of the legal profession and,
consequently, define the responsibilities of an attorney in accordance with
the various functions a lawyer performs in the course of professional serv-
ice.79 The Proposed Rules recognize that as a representative of clients, a
lawyer acts as an advocate, adviser, agent, evaluator and intermediary and
in other capacities."0 The format of the Proposed Rules is divided into two
areas of professional concern, the practice of law and membership in the
' See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra.
72 See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
7 See text accompanying notes 37-45 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
" Doubts as to the existence of an asserted conflict of interests should be resolved in favor
of disqualification. See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d
Cir. 1978); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975). Since conflicts of interests
arise in nonlitigious situations, doubts as to the propriety of the representation should also
be resolved in favor of withdrawal from that representation. See ABA CODE, DR 5-105.,
78 See notes 3 & 4 supra. See generally Armstrong, Codes of Professional Responsibility,
in PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmLmrY: A GUIDE FOR ATrorNEYs 1 (1978).
See note 9 supra.
T' ABA COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (working draft, August 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA RULES].
1' ABA RULES, supra note 78, at Preamble. The Proposed Rules define a lawyer as an
officer of the legal system, a representative of clients, and a public citizen having a special
responsibility for the quality of justice. Id.
"See ABA RULES, supra note 78, at Preamble.
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legal profession."' The specific rules for ethical behavior and their accom-
panying commentaries are written in terms of the roles assumed by attor-
neys and the various ethical dilemmas attorneys encounter in the course
of client representation. The Proposed Rules, therefore, offer substantial
guidance in situation-dependent decisions such as conflict of interests
problems.82 Although the Proposed Rules continue to emphasize the im-
portance of upholding the fiduciary duties of confidentiality and loyalty, '
they acknowledge that responses to a conflict of interests may vary accord-
ing to the operation of a particular law practice.84
The Proposed Rules also recognize that the nature and extent of an
attorney's participation in a client representation may determine the exist-
ence of a conflict of interests.9 Peripheral or rudimentary involvement in
a case is insufficient as a basis for a conflict of interests allegation, whereas
extensive participation in decision-making and case strategy is fundamen-
tal to an actual conflict of interests.86 Although the future of the Proposed
1, See ABA RuLEs, supra note 78. The legal practice heading under the Proposed Rules
addresses the obligations an attorney owes in a client-lawyer relationship, see id. at § 1, as
well as the responsibilities and problems that arise in the course of a specific role-oriented
representation as adviser, advocate, negotiator, intermediary, or evaluator. See id. at §§ 2,
3, 4, 5 & 6. For example, if an attorney agrees to evaluate and report upon an individual's
legal affairs, the Proposed Rules distinguish between a confidential and an independent
evaluation. See id. at § 6.0. In a confidential evaluation, the client retains the attorney and
is the sole person privy to the results of the evaluation. Id. at § 6.1. Consequently, the attorney
is bound by the fiduciary duty of confidentiality. Id. If the evaluation is independent, the
information gathered about the client is given to a third party. Id. at § 6.2. As a result, the
attorney owes a duty of reasonable care to the party that will rely on the report. The attorney
also has a duty to his client not to disclose confidential information to anyone other than the
third party authorized by the client to receive the information. Id. at Comment. The legal
profession heading of the Proposed Rules is concerned with maintaining the integrity of the
legal profession and addresses the specific problems of public service representation, advertis-
ing, and unprofessional conduct. See id. at §§ 8, 9, 10 & 11.
81 See note 81 supra.
" ABA RuLEs, supra note 78, at §§ 1.5 & 1.6. The Proposed Rules delineate the legal
duties of confidentiality and loyalty an attorney owes his clients, id., and emphasize that
professional obligations also depend upon personal conscience and recognition of these obliga-
tions by an attorney's professional peers. Id. at Preamble.
91 ABA RuLEs, supra note 78, at § 7. The Proposed Rules provide for the problem of
vicarious disqualification, see id. at § 7.1, by endorsing a rebuttable presumption of imputed
knowledge. Id. at Comment. Although the presumption of imputed knowledge should be
applied where the law firm is small and the clients are extensively represented, application
of the presumption is unrealistic where the firm is large and clients are represented for limited
purposes. Id. Furthermore, the Rules recognize operational differences among law firms and
the resultant variations in possibilities for dissemination of client confidences throughout a
law firm. Id. Since preservation of client confidences is a question of access to information,
the Proposed Rules state that relevant factors in determining the likelihood of actual access
include the professional experience of the attorney involved, the division of responsibility for
the matter in question, the organizational structure of the firm, and sensitivity of the informa-
tion and its relevance to the present controversy. Id.
,5 ABA RULES, supra note 78, at § 7.1 & Comment.
88 Id. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57
(2d Cir. 1975); note 53 supra.
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Rules is uncertain,87 the working draft is evidence that a mechanistic appli-
cation of the substantial relationship test is unsatisfactory when an attor-
ney is faced with a conflict of interests situation in a nonlitigious context.
Although representation of adverse interests in litigious or nonlitigious
situations may result in a conflict of interests, an attorney may represent
interests adverse to those of a former client provided that, upon full disclo-
sure of the circumstances of the subsequent representation, 8 the former
client consents to the adverse representation. Furthermore, since the
Code also requires that an attorney clearly determine that he can ade-
quately protect the interests of his current and former clients, ° undertak-
ing representation of adverse interests implicitly involves a good faith de-
termination by the attorney that the subsequent representation is proper.
A refusal on the part of the former client to permit dual representation,
therefore, raises the issue of whether a good faith determination by the law
firm that no ethical impropriety exists is sufficient to permit the firm to
represent a client in a nonlitigious situation.
Representation in litigation of interests adverse to a former client
clearly is improper without the consent of the former client.8 Consent is
crucial to a situation involving successive representation, because the for-
mer client's grant of permission to represent another client having possibly
adverse interests is a waiver of the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to the
former client.2 Moreover, the former client's consent is a waiver of his right
" The text of the Rules is only a working draft in continual revision. See Winer, Ethics
Draft Ignites Uproar, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at 1, col. 1. Attorneys that have read the
working draft criticize the Rules for failing to consider financial realities, for not providing
sufficient guidance for trial lawyers, and for not showing evidence of a systematic study of
ethical conflicts in current practice. Id. at 12, col. 2, 3 & 4.
U See ABA CODE, DR 5-105(C); International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d
271, 282 (3d Cir. 1978); notes 4 & 9 supra.
11 See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 1978); note
66 supra. In the course of a private antitrust suit, IBM moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel
on the grounds that the firm had represented both the plaintiff and IBM in the district court.
579 F.2d at 275. A central issue was whether an attorney who has asserted a claim against a
client pursuant to his representation of a second client may continue to represent the first
client in a matter unrelated to the lawsuit without full disclosure to the client being sued and
without obtaining his consent. Id. at 279. Reasoning that notice to general counsel of the
adverse representation does not constitute proper disclosure and consent, the court held that
continued representation of a client being sued by the law firm in an unrelated matter violates
DR 5-105 if that client has not effectively consented to the simultaneous representation. Id.
at 281. See ABA CODE, DR 5-105.
so See ABA CODE, DR 5-105(C).
11 See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 1978); cf.
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384,1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976) (simultaneous adverse
representation of concurrent clients held prima facie improper).
12 ABA CODE, DR 5-105(C). Since the professional judgment of an attorney is exercised
solely for the benefit of his client, id. at EC 5-1, a client's consent to representation adverse
to his interests operates to release his attorney from fiduciary obligations only for the one
specific representation. See Attorney's Conflict, supra note 4, at 83.
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to object to the adverse representation." The consent issue has powerful
and possibly detrimental consequences to the former client, and thus,
courts have generally enforced strict requirements for effective consent. 4
Consequently, any inconsistencies in formal consent are construed against
the law firm. 5
Although the Code requires an attorney to withdraw from situations
involving adverse representation without client consent,"6 the Code also
demands that an attbrney vigorously represent a client within the bounds
of the law. 7 Faced with these potentially conflicting duties, an attorney's
good faith decision may be influential in deciding upon the best course of
action in a potential conflict of interests situation. One court has main-
tained that once a motion for disqualification has been filed in the course
of litigation, withdrawal from representation may be a dereliction of the
duty of zealous representation if the attorney reasonably and in good faith
believes that no impropriety exists. Furthermore, an attorney may con-
" See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. ilum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 205 (N.D. Ohio
1977); Marketti v. Fitzsimmons, 373 F. Supp. 637, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Attorney's Conflict,
supra note 4, at 81.
2, Although courts have generally held informed consent of a client to his attorney's
representation of adverse interests to be adequate, see, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Cleveland
Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 201 (N.D. Ohio 1977), mere constructive knowledge of
pertinent facts does not constitute effective consent, International Business Mach. Corp. v.
Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 282 (3d Cir. 1978), and simple telephonic assent does not operate as
effective consent. Id. Written consent, however, to a specific representation involving a possi-
ble conflict of interests is effective consent. See 440 F. Supp. at 201. Where the client is a
business organization, proper consent may be obtained only from the full board of directors.
See In re Westgate-California Corp. [1979] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 67,083 (S.D. Cal. Dec.
28, 1978); note 89 supra.
11 See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d
920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954). In a complex antitrust suit involving the motion picture industry,
the defendants moved to disqualify the plaintiffs' attorneys on the ground that one attorney
had formerly served in the large law firm representing the defendants in the action. Id. at
922. The court held that an agreement between an attorney and his former law firm to restrict
the attorney's participation in matters with which he had been previously involved was too
ambiguous to constitute consent to adverse representation and was not binding on the former
client. Id. at 927; accord, In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89
(5th Cir. 1976). Consent by a former client to the simultaneous representation of an adverse
interest will also preclude disqualification of an attorney in a criminal case. See United States
v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975); Fourth Circuit Review, 36 WASH. & LE_ L. REv. 506,
527 (1979).
" See ABA CODE, DR 5-105.
9 See ABA CODE, Canon 7. Canon 7 demands vigorous, competent legal representation
of a client by an attorney. Id.; see Brosnahan & Brosnahan, Ethics in an Adversary
Proceeding in PROFESSIONAL.REsPONSImLrry: A Gum. FOR AiroRNys 195 (1978).
"1 See First Wis. Mort. Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 206 (7th Cir. 1978). The
First Wisconsin court disqualified defense counsel because of prior simultaneous representa-
tion of his client's adversary. Id. at 203. The court adopted a case-by-case approach, however,
and stated that the attorney's good faith denial of a conflict of interests charge precluded his
withdrawal from the representation prior to judicially imposed disqualification. Id. at 206.
The court based its reasoning upon the Canon 7 requirement that an attorney must vigorously
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tinue representation under these circumstances if the court determines
that no improper advantage has been secured, such as the use of confiden-
tial information."
In nonlitigious circumstances, however, there is no impartial party to
determine whether an attorney has gained an improper advantage from
prior receipt of confidential information."' There is no presumption of
unethical behavior on the part of an attorney."' An attorney's good faith
decision, however, that no impropriety exists in representing adverse inter-
ests without the client's consent is an insufficient safeguard against the
enhanced possibility outside of litigation for unconsciously transforming a
client confidence into an advantage for another client in a subsequent
proceeding." 2
In addition to the strict judicial construction of adequate consent, a
former client's outright denial of permission to represent adverse interests
operates as a bar to an attorney's undertaking the subsequent representa-
tion, despite a good faith determination of its propriety under the Code.0 3
The existence of an effective intrafirm isolation system may convince a
former client that his confidences are secure and, therefore, persuade him
to consent to adverse representation."' In the absence of consent, however,
even a Chinese Wall system coupled with a good faith determination of the
absence of impropriety may not be sufficient to protect a former client's
confidences from later use. 5 Furthermore, neither an isolation system nor
represent his client. Id.; see ABA CODE, Canon 7; Attorney's Conflict, supra note 4, at 64.
See generally Morgan, supra note 3, at 733-37.
" See Novo Terapeutisk Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir.
1979); First Wis. Mort. Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 211 (7th Cir. 1978).
' Since a lawsuit is an adversary proceeding, see City of Tulsa v. Board of Trustees,
387 P.2d 255, 258 (1963), a judge, or a judge with a jury, finds facts and determines the
appropriate law from submissions made by partisan advocates 'on behalf of the parties.
HAZARD, supra note 9, at 120; see text at note 57 supra. In nonlitigious situations involving
conflicts of interests, an attorney and his firm must decide whether the anticipated client
representation is proper. See ABA CODE, EC 5-15.
See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); Woods v.
Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d
311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975).
'1 See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). In Emle,
plaintiff's counsel had previously represented the part owner of the defendant-corporation in
patent litigation involving the identical issues raised in the subsequent case. Id. at 566. The
Emle court rejected the attorney's good faith as sole justification for representing conflicting
interests as offering inadequate protection of his former client's confidences. Id. at 570. The
court in Emle held that where the matters in the current and prior representations are
substantially related and informed consent from the former client is absent, a strict rule of
disqualification is necessary to prevent the slightest possibility of confidential information
from being used intentionally or inadvertantly to the detriment of a former client. Id. at 574;
accord, W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D.C. Conn. 1962); see ABA
CODE, Canon 4.
' See ABA CODE, EC 5-19.
"' See In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976).
" See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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a good faith justification will purge the strong appearance of impropriety
that a former client's refusal to consent to adverse representation creates.'
Refusal, therefore, on the part of a former client raises serious uncertainties
as to the propriety of the subsequent representation in a litigious or nonliti-
gious controversy. Since doubts concerning possible conflicts of interests
are resolved in favor of disqualification,"'7 an attorney's withdrawal from
the subsequent representation is appropriate in the absence of a former
client's consent.
In the event that an attorney continues to represent interests adverse
to those of a former client without obtaining the client's consent, the ques-
tion arises whether the former client has any recourse against the attorney
and his firm.' The former client may decide that the controversy is serious
enough to warrant legal action against his former attorney's current client
and, once in court, may move to disqualify his former counsel."0 ' If a
client's protest concerning the unethical behavior of his former counsel
arises in a nonlitigious context, he has access to most of the remedies
available to a litigant. Since the former client is not party to a lawsuit, he
does not have access to the disqualification motion as a self-protection
device. Anonlitigious controversy forces a former client to make a separate
application to a court for injunctive relief or a stay of any proceedings in
order to prevent the attorney from appearing on behalf of clients whose
interests are adverse to those of the former client.' In addition to remedial
"Is See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 1977);
W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D.C. Conn. 1962).
'o' See note 75 supra.
'' See Aronson, supra note 5, at 809-10. See also Gates & Zilly, Legal Malpractice, in
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrry: A GUIDE FOR ATroRNEYs 311 (1978).
10 See, e.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975). The district court
bears the responsibility of supervising the members of the bar and has discretionary power
to determine unethical behavior of the attorneys appearing before the court. Id.; accord,
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972).
110 See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1196 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 998 (1974). Prior to trial the defendants applied for and received an
order disqualifying plaintiffs' counsel and an injunction against attorney Goldberg from fur-
ther representation of the plaintiffs in the suit for violation of securities laws. Id. at 1193.
Goldberg, a former associate of defense counsel's law firm, was subsequently made a defen-
dant in the suit since he was an associate at the time the allegedly misleading stock registra-
tion was drafted by the firm. Id. Before trial, Goldberg appeared before the SEC to testify
concerning the omission of a finder's fee in the registration. Id. In an attempt to prove his
nonparticipation in the omission, Goldberg gave a copy of his SEC testimony to the plaintiffs'
firm. Id. On appeal from the injunction and disqualification order, the Meyerhofer court held
that Goldberg had a right to defend himself by disclosing information in support of his
noninvolvement in the public offering. Id. at 1195; see ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C). The court
permitted plaintiffs' counsel to continue representation since there had been no violation of
the Code to taint the relationship between plaintiffs' counsel and Goldberg. 497 F.2d at 1196.
The Meyerhofer court, however, upheld the injunction against Goldberg's participation as
counsel in the controversy. Id.; see Disqualification of Counsel, supra note 7, at 360. See
generally Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulating?
1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193.
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sanctions, a former client may decide to invoke punitive sanctions directly
against the attorney involved. A complaint to the local bar association may
result in a disciplinary proceeding against the attorney which may con-
clude with disbarment.' If the former client can prove that any harm he
suffered was the result of a breach of duty of the law firm or a particular
attorney, that client may also prevail in a malpractice suit."
2
The possibilities for conflicts of interests, in both litigious and nonliti-
gious situations, increase as legal problems and relationships grow in com-
plexity. The complicated and often interconnected controversies between
large corporate clients require competent legal representation, but increase
the possibility that a law firm will encounter conflicts of interests. Guide-
lines for recognizing and avoiding conflicts of interests must adapt to those
societal changes in order to provide the legal profession with-effective
means to maintain high ethical standards in various types of controversies.
Although a flexible approach to conflicts of interests is desirable, the fidu-
ciary obligations of confidentiality and loyalty must be upheld against an
attorney's good faith justification for representing adverse interests with-
out client consent. In the event that an attorney disregards a former
client's refusal to permit representation, several remedies are available to
that client.13 Modifications in codified rules of ethical conduct and in the
substantial relationship test should help provide guidance to attorneys in
dealing with conflicts of interests problems, particularly those arising out-
side the context of litigation.
CAROLYN R. SAFFOLD-H.YWARD
' See, e.g., State v. Kopke, 210 Kan. 330, -, 502 P.2d 813, 817 (1972) (attorney
censured); Cowley v. O'Connell, 174 Mass. 253, -, 54 N.E. 558, 559 (1899) (attorney
disbarred for representing both plaintiff and defendant in actions involving same issues);
Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Miller, 22 Ohio St. 2d 7, -, 257 N.E.2d 376, 380 (1970) (attorney
suspended from practice for one year); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St. 2d 208,
- 237 N.E.2d 298, 300 (1968) (attorney censured); Matter of Hall, 73 Wash. 2d 401, ,
438 P.2d 874, 875 (1968) (attorney disbarred for failure to reveal conflict of interests and for
breach of trust).
122 See, e.g., Blackmon v. Hale, 1 Cal. 3d 548, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1970); Hansen v.
Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238, 1246 (1975). See generally Gillen, Legal
Malpractice, 12 WAsHuRN L.J. 281 (1973).
,,3 See text accompanying notes 109-112 supra.
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